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What  is  the  relationship  between  belief  and  knowledge?  On  a  traditional  picture, 
knowledge  is  understood  as  belief  that’s  both  true  and  enjoys  a  certain  epistemic 
pedigree.  That  was  the  core  thought  behind  the  tripartite  analysis  of  knowledge, 
now  almost  universally  regarded  as  sunk  by  Gettier  (1963).  But  the  thought  has 









these  kinds  of  claims.  I will  argue  that  under  certain  conditions  one  can, without 






I  will  proceed  as  follows.  In  section  1  I  will  argue  that  true  beliefs  in  lottery 
propositions—that the lottery ticket one holds in one’s hand has lost, for example—
aren’t merely true by luck even when held on purely probabilistic grounds. This is a 
topic  of  considerable  independent  interest,  but  the  reason  for  its  inclusion  in  the 
present discussion is that the point will prove significant for the sections that follow. 
In section 2 I will present a case constructed out of materials developed in section 1, 
about which  the  intuitively  correct  verdict  is,  I will  suggest,  that  the  subject  both 
believes  P  and  believes  that  she  doesn’t  know  P  without  falling  into  incongruity. 
That’s  a  verdict  that we might  overturn  upon  being  presented with  a  sufficiently 
well motivated  thesis  that  entailed  the  contrary,  and  in  the  sections  that  follow  I 
introduce a number of theses that have been proposed in the literature which have 
that  consequence.  In  sections 3  through 6  I  argue  that  even  the most plausible  of 
these theses  lack any firm motivation, considering  in turn the claims that we treat 
our beliefs as knowledge (section 3), that we are rationally committed to so treating 
our beliefs  (section 4),  that  the norm of belief  is  the knowledge norm (section 5), 
and  that belief aims at knowledge (section 6). My conclusion will be  that we have 
been offered no good grounds on which to overturn our  initial verdict on the case 

















an  important  asymmetry  concerning  the  role  that  luck  plays:  although winning  a 
large lottery is a matter of  luck,  losing one isn’t.  If one doesn’t share this  intuition, 
consider  increasing  the  number  of  tickets  in  the  draw  without  increasing  the 
number  of winning  tickets,  or  consider  some  of  the  lottery  variants  discussed  by 
Jonathan Vogel (1990) and John Hawthorne (2004): given my age, I would be very 
unlucky to die  from a heart attack this year, but  it’s not a matter of  luck  if  I don’t; 





Isn’t  there a sense  in which we might describe  the  lottery  loser as unlucky? Yes,  I 
think  that  must  be  conceded.  This  somewhat  complicates  but  does  not  spoil  the 
point  of  the  previous  paragraph.  Sometimes  ‘lucky’  and  ‘unlucky’  are  used 
interchangeably  with  ‘fortunate’  and  ‘unfortunate’  respectively.  On  the  plausible 
account of what it is for an event to be fortunate offered by Duncan Pritchard (2005, 
pp 144n15), an event is fortunate just in case it is favorable even though it was out 
of  one’s  control  (and  likewise  for  an  event  to  be  unfortunate  is  for  it  to  be 
unfavorable and out of one’s control).2 This yields one sense in which one can truly 
say  that  one  is  lucky  (or  unlucky)  to  have  the  parents  one  has,  even  if  this  is  a 
metaphysical  necessity.  My  point  in  the  previous  paragraph  isn’t  spoiled  by  the 
concession  that  we  may  sometimes  describe  a  lottery  loss  as  unlucky,  since  the 
lottery  loss  is  only  unlucky  in  the  sense  of  being  unfortunate.  To  finesse  the 
complication  raised  here,  we  may  ask,  as  I  will  in  my  more  careful  moments, 






Although this asymmetry has been noticed  in the  literature on epistemic  luck (see 
for  instance  Coffman  (2007)  and  Levy  (2009)),  an  immediate  and  important 




lottery  propositions  aren’t  true  by  luck.  So  if  such  beliefs  fail  to  constitute 
knowledge,  as many  epistemologists  have  argued  or  assumed,  this  is  not  because 





2008),  we  should  not  lose  sight  of  the  differences  with  standard  Gettier  cases 
concealed by that common description.4 
 
What  drives  the  thought  that  lottery  propositions  cannot  be  known  before  the 
announcement if not the claim that such a belief could only be true by luck? My own 
view,  though  this  is  admittedly  very  controversial,  is  that  it’s  the  idea  that 
knowledge excludes the ‘easy possibility’ of error, in the sense that there is at least 
one close possible world  in which one  forms that belief but  it  is not  true. Call  this 









I have argued  that  lottery beliefs aren’t  true by  luck.  If we want  to hold  that  such 
propositions  cannot  be  known  (before  the  outcome  of  the  draw  is  publically 
announced),  an  alternative diagnosis  is  needed.  I’ve  suggested  that  a  safety‐based 
diagnosis is available, so long as we take care to distinguish this kind of explanation 










Jane  holds  one  of  one million  tickets  for  a  fair  lottery.  The  lottery  draw has  been 
made, and Jane’s ticket was not selected, but she has yet to hear an announcement 
concerning the outcome. She doesn’t care all that much though, since she is already 
convinced  that her  ticket  is a  loser. She  regards  this belief as  justified,  though not 
knowledge;  that  is,  she  believes  her  ticket  will  lose,  believes  that  this  belief  is 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this  condition.  Knowledge  requires  more.  It  requires  that  my  belief  not 








We  might  object  to  various  aspects  of  Jane’s  position.  Perhaps  we  think  that 
justification requires more (or something other)  than evidential  likelihood, and so 
that  she  is wrong  to  regard  her  belief  that  her  ticket  has  lost  as  justified  (Smith, 
2010). Perhaps we think that the safety condition she takes knowledge to impose is 
too  demanding.  Or  perhaps  we  will  want  to  dispute  her  suggestion  that  it’s  not 
merely a matter of  luck  that her belief  is  true  (though  I hope  the argument of  the 
previous section will at least give one pause). Still, even if we regard Jane as holding 
mistaken  views  about  substantive  issues  in  epistemology,  it  is  not  clear  on  what 
grounds we would regard her or her belief that her ticket has lost as unreasonable 
  8 
or  irrational—as  incongruous,  in my  terminology.8  Jane seems  to have a relatively 
stable,  consistent,  coherent picture of  the  epistemic  status of  lottery propositions, 
one  that  a  number  of  epistemologists will  find  attractive  given  their  views  about 
knowledge and justification. Indeed, her stance seems to be one of relative epistemic 
humility,  motivated  by  reflection  on  the  demands  of  knowledge,  and  how  they 
contrast with the demands of justification. 
 
The  verdict  that  Jane’s  convinction  may  be  congruous  clashes  with  the  one 









proposed  that  one  treats  one’s  beliefs  as  knowledge.  In  order  to  evaluate  this 
proposal, we first need to pin down what it claims. On the simplest account, to treat 
one’s belief that P as knowledge is just to believe that one knows P. So understood, 





has manifestly  contradictory  beliefs  about whether  she  knows  that  her  ticket  has 
lost. However, on  this  interpretation  the claim that we  treat each of our beliefs as 
knowledge  is  hopeless.  As Williamson  points  out  in  a  different  context  (2007,  pp 







we may believe  them nonetheless;  to adapt an example  from Hawthorne (2004),  I 
might  believe  that  my  ticket  will  lose,  and  yet  be  unwilling  to  employ  this  as  a 
premise when deciding whether to sell my ticket for a penny. At the very least, we 
need  to  see  some  argument  before  we  should  conclude  that  we  don’t  regularly 






it  strongly  or  to  a  high degree’  (2002,  pp 36).  It might now be  suggested  that we 
don’t  fully  believe  lottery  propositions,  and  so  my  objection  in  the  previous 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I  think  I  fully believe  that my car hasn’t been stolen overnight—or at  least,  I’m as 
confident  about  that  as  I  am  about  most  of  my  other  beliefs  about  contingent 
matters. Unless the proposal is that full belief is a state we rarely succeed in getting 
ourselves  into,  I  have  a  hard  time  seeing  why  we  should  hold  that  I  don’t  fully 
believe  that  my  car  hasn’t  been  stolen.  So  we’re  owed  an  account  of  what 
distinguishes my  belief  that my  ticket will  lose  from my  belief  that my  car  hasn’t 
been  stolen,  such  that  we  might  be  warranted  in  taking  the  latter,  but  not  the 







Huemer  suggests  instead  that,  although  one  may  not  take  one’s  beliefs  as 








Huemer supports his principle with  the premise  that  if one consciously believes P 
and  one  reflects  on whether  one’s  belief  is  ‘epistemically  acceptable’,  then  one  is 
rationally  committed  to  ‘comprehensively,  epistemically  endorsing’  one’s  belief 
(2007, pp 148). As Huemer understands this premise, it entails that Jane is irrational 
if she continues to believe P while recognizing that her belief could easily have been 
false. But  I  see no  reason whatsoever  to  accept  the premise,  read  in  this  strong  a 
manner,  nor does Huemer offer  any,  aside  from suggesting  that  it  forms part  of  a 











entails  that  the  subjects  in  Gettier  cases  ought  not  believe  the  propositions  in 
question, and I  find this very hard to swallow. Of course, defenders of  the account 
will  be willing  to  bite  this  bullet,  and  they will  be  able  to  avail  themselves  of  the 
same defensive move made by proponents of the knowledge norm of assertion (see, 














her  belief  is  knowledgeable,  given  that  it  is  her  considered  view  that  it  is  not 
knowledgeable. Since she does not reasonably believe that she knows that her ticket 
has  lost, her belief  is not only  improper but also unreasonable  by  the  lights of  the 
proposal  introduced  in  the previous paragraph.  Supplemented with  that proposal, 
the knowledge norm of belief entails that the kind of epistemic humility involved in 
  13 





also  conceded  that  judgments  about  such  cases  can  be  overturned  in  the  face  of 






























knowledge  norm  too.  Adler  presents  twenty  points  of  comparison  between  belief 
and assertion that, taken collectively, are taken to support an inference to the best 














we  are  told  that  assertion  is  ‘subject  to  demands  on  the  social  activity  of 
conversation’  (2002,  pp  277).  The  analogue  is  that  belief  ‘is  constantly  subject  to 
multiple  interests,  influences,  and  mental  and  social  demands’.  But  virtually  any 
speech act and virtually any mental state could be paired off in this fashion. There is 
no  distinctive  parallel  between  assertion  and  belief  here.  Again,  Adler  suggests 







It  is unclear what status  is being claimed  for  this point, and so  its  truth  is hard  to 
















Adler  suggests  that  the  ‘transparency’ of both belief  and assertion  is  the  ‘heart’ of 
the  parallel  between  them  (2002,  pp  193).  Here’s  is  how  Adler  cashes  out  the 
transparency of assertion:  
 






it  to  be  the  case  that  p,  detached  from  one’s  attitude  of  believing.  So  the 
  17 
normal  role of  the belief  that p  is as directing  the believer  to p  (the world) 
itself, not one’s attitude toward p. (2002, pp 274) 
 






analogue  of  the  transparency  of  belief.  For  the  transparency  of  belief,  as  Adler 
describes it, is essentially first­personal, in a way that the content of one’s assertions 
being  ‘detached’  from one’s attitudes—however we manage  to make sense of  that 
idea—is not. One  treats what one believes as how  the world actually  is;  one  ‘sees 
through  one’s  attitude  to  the  world’  as  Adler  puts  the  point  (2002,  pp  11).  But 
naturally it is only one’s own attitudes that one finds transparent to the world in this 
way. There is no such first‐person/third‐person asymmetry concerning whether the 





Let  us  turn  finally  to  the most  interesting  of  the  claimed  points  of  parallel.  Adler 
notes  (2002, pp 275)  that  just  as  an assertion of  a  statement of  the  form  ‘P, but  I 
  18 
























be described, without  circularity,  as  the expression of a mental  state or act 
only  if  there  exist  non‐conventional ways  of  expressing  it;  for  instance, we 
can describe the convention governing a gesture of greeting by saying that it 
is used as an expression of pleasure at  seeing somebody, only because  it  is 
possible  to  express  such  pleasure  without  the  use  of  the  conventional 
gesture.  Most  judgments,  however,  it  would  be  senseless  to  ascribe  to 
someone who had not a language capable of expressing them, because there 
















(2)  is  very  plausible,  (1)  less  so.  Even  if we  grant  both,  all  that  follows  is  that  no 
conventional  act  can  be  described  as  the  expression  of  (many  of)  our  beliefs.  No 
conclusion about assertion  follows without  the  further premise  that assertion  is  a 
conventional  act.  Now,  there  are  many  senses  of  ‘conventional’,  and  no  doubt 
assertion  counts  as  a  conventional  act  according  to  some  of  them  (compare Bach 
and Harnish, 1979, pp 132‐134). However, most of those who conceive of assertion 
as  the  expression  of  belief  do  not  hold  that  assertion  is  a  conventional  act  in  any 
central  or  important  sense.17  Dummett  himself  held  that  assertion  was 
conventionally tied to the indicative mood.18 This particular proposal is widely held 
to  have  fallen  to Davidson’s  (1979) well‐known objections.  So we  are  under  little 




account of  assertion. As  a proponent of  a belief‐expression  account,  I’m willing  to 
grant  this  disjunction  (which  is  one  reason  I’ve  taken  such  pains  to  show  that 
Dummett’s  argument  is  suspect  even  if  one  does  grant  this).  But  advocates  of 
accounts of the relationship between assertion and belief not happily described by 




it.  Bird  (2007,  pp  95)  argues  that  one  is  warranted  in  believing  P  only  if  one  is 
  21 
warranted in asserting P to oneself, and so since the  latter requires knowledge, so 
must  the  former.19  But  why  does  Bird  focus  on  asserting  to  oneself?  Presumably 
because  the more general claim that one  is warranted  in believing P only  if one  is 





for  the  utterly  natural  thought  that  asserting  to  oneself  can  be  less  epistemically 
demanding  than  asserting  to  an  audience.  The upshot  is  that  the  two premises  of 
Bird’s  argument  are  somewhat  in  tension  with  each  other.  The  claim  that  one  is 
warranted  in  believing  P  only  if  one  is  warranted  in  asserting  it  to  oneself  is 
compelling  enough  so  long  as  we  tacitly  assume  that  the  epistemic  demands  on 






account  of  assertion  are  committed  to  the  claim  that  knowledge  is  not  only 
necessary  for  warranted  assertion,  but  also  sufficient.  This  is  not  immediately 
obvious, but it is easily enough supported. Recall from above the explanation offered 
by  defenders  of  the  knowledge  norm  of  assertion  of  our  sense  that  subjects  in 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Gettier  cases  and  subjects  who  assert  on  the  basis  of  misleading  evidence  have 
asserted well, despite failing to know that which they assert. The idea was that even 
though  such  assertions  are  improper,  they  are  reasonable because  the  subjects  in 
these cases reasonably take themselves to know. But if knowledge is necessary but 
not  sufficient  for  proper  assertion,  then  reasonably  taking  oneself  to  know  is  a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for reasonable assertion, and that isn’t enough 
to explain why we feel the subjects in the problem cases have asserted well. For this 
reason,  when  Williamson  offers  his  explanation  he  explicitly  assumes  that 
knowledge  is  sufficient  for  proper  assertion.20  The  upshot  is  that while  the  claim 
that  knowledge  is  necessary  for  proper  assertion  is  logically  independent  of  the 






candidate.  Jonathan  Sutton  (2007,  pp  44‐48)  offers  an  argument  from  the 
knowledge  norm  of  assertion  to  the  conclusion  that  justified  belief  demands 
knowledge. He asks us to suppose for reductio that Andy has an impeccably justified 
belief that P, but doesn’t know P. Andy asserts P to Bob. Since we are assuming that 
the knowledge norm of  assertion  is  correct, we  can  conclude  that  the  assertion  is 
epistemically  improper,  even  though  it  expresses  a  belief  that  is  impeccably 
justified. And this, Sutton claims, is ‘exceptionally puzzling’ and ‘mysterious’, since a 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principal goal  (perhaps even  the principal goal) of asserting  is  the  transmission of 
belief. 
 
This  argument  is  very  puzzling,  since  it  is  natural  to  think  that  if  one  holds  the 
knowledge account of assertion, one will also hold that the primary goal of asserting 
is  to  transmit  knowledge  (Williamson,  2000,  pp.  267‐268).  Sutton  preempts  this 
response, suggesting that it would be ‘bizarre’ if the primary goal of assertion failed 
to  encompass  the  transmission  of  impeccably  justified  beliefs  (2007,  pp  47). 
Bizarreness  is  in  the eye of  the beholder, however, and Sutton offers no argument 
for why we  should  share  his  reaction.  For my  own  part,  I  don’t  find  this  all  that 








having  the  requisite  knowledge,  is  to  discharge  that  responsibility,  by 
epistemically  ensuring  the  truth  of  the  content.  Our  possession  of  such 




The  analogy Williamson  is  drawing  here  breaks  down  between  commanding  and 
believing. If I assert P (rather than, say, conjecturing that P), and you act as if P on 
that basis, you are typically entitled to complain to me, and in some circumstances 
demand compensation  from me  for any  resulting damage,  if P  turns out not  to be 
true. You have no such entitlements if I merely believe P; if you discern on the basis 
of my behavior that I believe P, and act as if P on that basis, you have no entitlement 
to  complain  or  demand  compensation  if  P  proves  not  to  be  true.  So  the 
Williamsonian  account  of  why  it  is  the  transmission  of  knowledge  that  is  the 
primary goal of assertion, in terms of our need for relations of responsibility, offers 
a fairly natural explanation of why the principal goal of assertion fails to encompass 




goal  of  assertion  is  the  transmission  of  knowledge  and  that  some  impeccably 
justified beliefs  aren’t  knowledge. And  so  I  continue  to  find his  original  argument 
very puzzling.21 
 
Despite  digging  up  a  massive  amount  of  terrain  in  this  section,  and  despite 
















Recall  from  section  2  that  Jane  believes  that  she  is  justified  in  believing  that  her 
lottery ticket has lost, but she also believes that she this is something she does not 
and  cannot  know.  Bird  (2007:  101)  argues  that  there  is  a  ‘powerful  tension  […], 
verging  on  inconsistency’  in  the  suggestion  that  one  can  be  justified  in  believing 
lottery propositions but cannot know them, since (1) knowledge is the aim of belief 
and since (2) a belief cannot be justified if its aim cannot be achieved. Let us concede 






independent  factors’  (2007,  pp  94‐95).23  This  is  odd,  according  to  Bird,  because 
Gettier  cases  illustrate  that  ‘there  is  nothing  special  about  a  belief  that  is  both 
justified  and  true’  (2007,  pp 95). And  so he  contends  that  the best  explanation of 
why belief aims at both truth and justification is that knowledge is the aim of belief.  
 
But Gettier  cases don’t  show  that  there  is  nothing  special  about any  justified  true 
beliefs  that  fail  to  amount  to  knowledge;  at most  they  show  that  there  is  nothing 
special about any  justified  true beliefs  that  fail  to be knowledge because  they have 
been Gettierized.  Jane’s view  is  that,  for certain propositions, knowledge cannot be 
the goal of  inquiry since  it  is unattainable. We have  to settle  for  less, but crucially 
Jane  can  insist  that  settling  for  less  does not  commit  one  to  regarding  subjects  in 
Gettier cases as having met the aim of belief, since according to Jane such subjects 
have  beliefs  that  are  merely  true  by  luck.  Even  where  belief  aims  at  less  than 
knowledge,  it  aims  at  non‐accidental  truth.  Bird’s  argument  simply  glosses  over 





We  have  uncovered  no  compelling  argument  for  any  thesis  linking  belief  and 
knowledge  in  such  a  way  Jane’s  position  is  revealed  as  contradictory,  or  as 





distinguished  in  our  discussion  so  far.  The  question  that  remains  is:  under  what 





to  this  point.  Now,  one  cannot  hold  congruously  believe  P  while  regarding  P  as 
unknown  if  the  reason  one  believes  that  one  doesn’t  know P  is  that  one  believes 





reason one believes  that one doesn’t know that one’s  lottery  ticket has  lost  is  that 
one believes that the truth condition on knowledge isn’t met (i.e. one believes that 









should  hold  this  combination  of  attitudes.24  The  reasoning  concerning  the 
justification  condition  on  knowledge  is  the  same,  except  the  incongruous 





one’s  belief  that  P  is  true.25  But  one  cannot  seriously  believe  this while  regarding 







o’clock. For without  independent evidence  for believing  that  the clock  is currently 
reading the right time, one cannot regard the fixed position of the clock’s hands as 
giving one the slightest reason to believe that it’s one o’clock. So unless one has the 
absurd belief  that seeing  the  time displayed by a stopped clock, which one has no 









P while believing  that one does not know P when  (and perhaps only when27)  this 
latter belief is held on grounds that one reasonably does not take to imply: that P is 
false; that one doesn’t after all believe that P; that one believes P but unjustifiably; 
or  that  one  has  been  Gettierized  with  respect  to  P.  And  this  is  precisely  Jane’s 












I  have  argued  that  under  certain  conditions  one  can  congruously  believe  that  P 
while believing  that one doesn’t  know P,  those  conditions being  that one’s  reason 
for the latter belief does not undermine,  in one’s own eyes at  least, one’s ability to 




We  can  introduce  the  first  by  considering  an  objection  to  the  position  I  have 
developed. I allow that one can congruously believe that P while believing that one 
does  not  know  P.  But  this  might  strike  us  as  dangerously  close  to  the  epistemic 






but  I  don’t  believe  P29—are  inherently  incongruous  don’t  apply  to  these  epistemic 
variants. For example, we might point out that if belief distributes over conjunction, 
then  one  believes  P  but  I  don’t  believe  P  only  if  one  believes  P.  But  the  truth 
conditions  of  one’s  belief  require  that  one  not  believe  that  P,  and  so  one’s  belief 
cannot be true (given that one holds it). Such beliefs are inherently self‐defeating in 




not  in  turn  require  that  one  not  believe  P,  and  so  there’s  no  immediate  clash.  To 
obtain  a  clash,  we  need  to  bring  in  some  heavyweight  thesis  linking  belief  and 
knowledge—theses such as  the ones considered and rejected earlier  in  this paper. 





It  should  be  conceded,  I  think,  that  epistemic  Moorean  assertions  almost  always 
strike people as absurd. Unfortunately, as noted above, this concession gives rise to 
a  challenge  to  my  claim  that  epistemic  Moorean  beliefs  are  not  inherently 
incongruous.  One  standard  way  to  explain  the  perceived  absurdity  of  epistemic 
Moorean assertions goes via the claim that the beliefs expressed by such assertions 
are  inherently  incongruous  (see,  for  instance,  Bach  (2007)).  This  proposed 
explanation is, of course, just a direct analogue of the explanation of the absurdity of 
assertions of the form ‘P but I don’t believe that P’ that I expressed sympathy for in 
section  5  above.  However,  I  can’t  accept  this  analogue,  since  I’ve  argued  that 
epistemic Moorean beliefs aren’t  inherently incongruous. This suggests that I must 
insist  that  we  need  to  try  a  different  tack,  explaining  the  absurdity  of  epistemic 
Moorean  assertions  with  appeal  to  principles  that  apply  to  the  speech  act  of 
assertion,  but  not  to  the  underlying  beliefs.  If  we  choose  this  path,  we  then  face 
questions  about  whether  familiar  pragmatic  principles  such  as  Grice’s 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conversational  maxims  suffice  to  explain  what  is  wrong  with  epistemic  Moorean 
assertions,  as Weiner  (2005)  and  Lackey  (2007)  contend,  or whether we  have  to 
accept  something  akin  to  the  knowledge  norm  of  assertion,  as  Williamson  has 
argued.31  Like  Williamson,  I’m  deeply  suspicious  of  the  claim  that  the  pragmatic 









express  beliefs  that  are  widely  (though,  I  have  argued,  mistakenly)  held  to  be 
inherently  incongruent.  I  suggest  that  this offers  an—admittedly  somewhat error‐
theoretic—explanation of why epistemic Moorean assertions  almost  always  strike 








Russell  in  The  Problems  of  Philosophy,  and  discussed  more  recently  by  Crispin 




our preconceptions, we have no  genuine knowledge  in  some broad  area of 
our  thought—say  in  the  area  of  theoretical  science.  We  can  live  with  the 
concession  that  we  do  not,  strictly,  know  some  of  the  things  we  believed 
ourselves  to  know,  provided  we  can  retain  the  thought  that  we  are  fully 
justified  in  accepting  them.  That  concession  is  what  we  might  call  the 
Russellian  Retreat.  For  Russell  (1912,  Chs  I  and  II)  proposed  that  such  is 
exactly  the message which philosophical epistemology generally has  for us: 




arguments  purporting  to  show  that  we  cannot  possess  knowledge  within  a 








manage  to  hang  on  to  the  idea  that  one’s  beliefs  in  propositions  in  the  class  in 
question  are  justified;  one  must  also  be  able  to  reasonably  maintain  that  one’s 
beliefs are not merely true by luck. We cannot live with the idea that our epistemic 
faculties and practices enable us  to get  things right, but only as a matter of happy 
coincidence.  This  means  that  whether  the  Retreat  offers  any  real  relief  from  the 
sceptical challenges depends on the extent to which those challenges leave intact the 




example,  Pritchard  (2005,  pp  15)  claims  that  the  role  of  scepticial  hypotheses  in 
arguments  for  scepticism  is  to  highlight  the  element  of  luck  in  our  getting  things 
right about the external world. However, we misunderstand the sceptical challenge 
if we construe  it as driven by  the  thought  that  it  is only a matter of  luck  if we get 
things  right. The  familiar  sceptical  scenarios depict  the possibility of undetectable 
error about how things are with the world, but sceptics do not typically argue that 
this  possibility  shows  that  it’s  only  a  matter  of  luck  that  one’s  beliefs  about  the 
world get things right, or even that the possibility of error  is modally proximate.34 
How  we  should  understand  the  sceptical  challenge,  and  the  role  that  sceptical 
hypotheses play in motivating that challenge are good questions, but they are ones 
for  another  occasion.35  For  now,  the  point  is  just  that  getting  clearer  on  the 
conditions  under which  one  can maintain  a  justified  belief while  accepting  that  it 
  35 
falls  short  of  knowledge  leads  to  an  improved  conception  of  what’s  involved  in 




for  another  occasion,  since  whether  the  Russellian  Retreat  is  either  needed  or 








and  of  practical  reasoning  each  demand  knowledge.  If  the  threat  of  scepticism 
motivates  a  Russellian  Retreat  on  a  grand  enough  scale,  then  it  would  seem  that 
either we are condemned  to make  the kinds of extreme concessions  to  scepticism 
countenanced by the Unger of Ignorance  (1975), or knowledge cannot provide the 
normative standard  for proper assertion, belief,  and practical  reasoning after all.  I 
hope here  to have cast serious doubt on  the knowledge norm of belief and on  the 
associated  picture  of mere  true  belief  as  a  kind  of  ‘botched’  knowing,  and  I  have 




epistemic  Moorean  assertions.  I  also  hope  to  have  planted  the  thought  that  the 
Russellian Retreat is worth taking more seriously than it usually is in the literature 
on scepticism. To the extent that I have succeeded in my aims, we should perhaps be 





I  have  argued  that  there  need  be  nothing  unreasonable  or  irrational—nothing 
incongruous, in my terminology—about believing P while simultaneously believing 
P  to  be  unknown.  I  have  constructed  a  case  that  offers my  thesis  a  great  deal  of 
intuitive plausibility, and have argued at length that the principles one finds in the 
literature that would support the opposed conclusion have not been sufficiently well 
motivated  to  counterbalance  that  plausibility.  My  discussion  has  suggested  a 
substantial  constraint  on  when  one  can  hold  such  a  belief  congruously,  that 
constraint being  that one can reasonably maintain  that one’s belief, while  justified 
and  true,  is  not  merely  true  by  luck.  Finally,  I  have  argued  for  three 
epistemologically significant upshots of my position. First, that contrary to popular 
misconception, epistemic Moorean beliefs are not inherently incongruous (and that 
perhaps  the  popularity  of  the  misconception  may  help  explain  why  the 
corresponding assertions so frequently strike people as absurd). Just as there need 
be  nothing  incongruous  about  believing  something  one  believes  to  be  unknown, 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there  need  be  nothing  incongruous  about  believing  something  which  is  in  fact 
unknown (indeed, unknowable). Second, that the Russellian Retreat needs revision 
in  light  of my  proposed  constraint  on  believing what  one  believes  oneself  not  to 
know,  and  that  so  revised,  the  Retreat  is  not  immediately  ruled  out  of  play  as  a 
response to the best sceptical challenges. And third, that the possibility of beating a 
Russellian  Retreat,  together  with  my  arguments  against  the  knowledge  norm  of 
belief  (and  related  theses),  should  make  us  think  twice  about  the  claim  that 





state  which  aims  at  knowledge,  and  which  must  be  irrational,  unreasonable,  or 
otherwise ‘botched’ if it fails to fulfill that aim. It is worth stressing that saying this 
much  does  not  commit  me  to  the  viability  of  the  traditional  project  of  analyzing 









terms  of  knowledge,  and  to  have  encouraged  the  thought  that  a  better 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the  relevant  sense,  and  it  being  fortunate.  The  present  point  could  be  made  using  Levy’s 




is  a  mistake  to  assimilate  lottery  cases  and  standard  Gettier  cases,  see  Cohen  (1998)  and  Smith 
(2010). 
5 For instance, see Sainsbury (1997), Sosa (1999), Williamson (2000) and Pritchard (2005). The final 




doesn’t  in  fact  make  this  mistake  (an  unfortunate  choice  of  phrasing  being  responsible  for  any 




be  completely  non‐lucky  that  one’s  belief  is  true.  Given  this,  it  seems  very  plausible  that  the 
requirement  that  the  truth  of  one’s  belief  be  completely  free  of  luck  is  derivative  from  the 
requirement that there be no close possibility of error, not vice versa. Safety is not just an anti‐luck 
condition on knowledge, nor can  it be motivated purely by appeal  to  the platitude  that knowledge 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excludes  particular  kinds  of  luck.  I  lack  the  space  to  argue  the  point  fully  here.  In  her  review  of 
Pritchard  (2005), Maria Lasonen‐Aarnio  (2007, pp 70) briefly makes  the point  I  am arguing  for  in 
this  section,  namely  that  failures  of  the  safety  condition  on  knowledge  need  not  involve  luck. 
However, she fails to really appreciate the point, concluding that ‘knowledge excludes luck in a more 










P’ almost always strike people as absurd.  Jane doesn’t quite express her position  like  that, but  she 
could, and were she to do so the perceived absurdity of her statement might reasonably be taken as 
indicating that the belief she expresses  is  incongruous. (See,  for  instance, Huemer (forthcoming).)  I 
will return to this point in section 8, where I’ll argue that no conclusion about the congruity of Jane’s 
beliefs  follows  from  the  apparent  absurdity  of  expressing  those  beliefs  in  the  form  of  a  Moorean 
conjunction. 
9  One  proposal  I want  to  set  aside  before  getting  going  is  that  defended  in  (Nelkin,  2000).  Nelkin 
claims that one cannot rationally believe lottery propositions because (i) they are based on statistical 
evidence, (ii) it is irrational to posit the right sort of connection between such evidence and the truth 
of  the  proposition  in  question,  and  (iii)  thinking  that  there’s  the  right  sort  of  connection  between 
one’s evidence and the truth of what it is evidence for is a condition on the rationality of the relevant 
belief.  Despite  Nelkin’s  claims  to  the  contrary,  I  worry  that  (iii)  wildly  overintellectualizes  what’s 
involved in having a rational belief. But it’s (ii) that’s really implausible. Nelkin claims that ‘it is clear 
from  the  nature  of  the  evidence  in  the  lottery  case  that  there  could  be  no  causal  or  explanatory 
connection between my evidence and the facts’ (2000, pp 398). I don’t think this is nearly as obvious 
as Nelkin makes out, and the claim that mistakenly positing such a connection is irrational is, to my 
mind at  least,  thrown  into doubt by  the  fact  that Nelkin  (2000,  pp 404‐5)  attributes precisely  this 
mistake to Gilbert Harman (1986). Even if Nelkin is right that Harman is mistaken and his arguments 
flawed, imputing irrationality is a further, to my mind completely unwarranted step. 
10  For  further  criticism  of  Huemer’s  premise,  see  Littlejohn  (2010,  pp  92‐3).  A  referee  draws my 













14  Despite  its  implausibility,  claims  of  this  sort  have  a  surprisingly  long  and  distinguished  history. 
Charles Sanders Peirce suggests a related view, according to which ‘judgment is held to be either no 
more than an assertion to oneself or at any rate something very like that’ (1903, pp 140, emphasis in 
original).  Similarly,  Michael  Dummett  holds  that  the  act  of  judgment  ‘is  the  interiorization  of  the 
external  act  of  assertion’  (1981,  pp 362).  Peter Geach defends  the  view  that  “x  judges  that man  is 
mortal” is to be interpreted as “x says in his heart something tantamount to ‘Man is mortal’” (1957, 















19  This  is  one  place  where  Bird  actually  speaks  of  ‘judging’  where  I  speak  of  ‘believing’,  but  this 
doesn’t make any difference to the points made in the text. 
20 ‘Indeed, if I am entitled to assume that knowledge warrants assertion, then, since it is reasonable for 
me to believe that I know that there  is snow outside,  it  is reasonable for me to believe that I know 
that there is snow outside. If it is reasonable for me to believe that I have warrant to assert that there 











belief quite this  freely, but I will  let  that go here, since  it seems clear that reference to the norm of 
belief at this stage is inessential to Bird’s argument. 
24  Interestingly,  the  claim  that one cannot  congruously believe P while believing  that one does not 




take  to believe P (see  the references  in note 30).  I’ll  leave these complications aside here,  though I 
return to them briefly in note 30 below.  




mentioned  in  section  6.  Up  to  this  point,  my  argument  here  is  closely  related  to  one  offered  in 
Littlejohn  (2010)  in  a  discussion of  the  epistemic  version of Moore’s  paradox. However,  Littlejohn 
overlooks the same possibility as Williams and Bird, namely that one might believe that one does not 
know P without believing that one’s belief that P is false, unjustified, or Gettierized, and so does not 
challenge  the  assumption  that  epistemic  Moorean  beliefs  are  incongruous.  This  possibility  is  also 
overlooked  by  Ryan’s  (1996)  ‘What  Else  Could  it  Be?’  argument  for  the  conclusion  that  if  lottery 
propositions aren’t known, this is because the justification condition on knowledge can’t be met, as 








good reason  for suspecting  that a given belief violates  that condition would serve as a defeater  for 
that  belief,  then  it  seems  that  also,  any  good  reason  for  doubting  that  a  given  belief  constitutes 
knowledge must serve as a defeater  for that belief. Therefore,  if one has good reason to doubt that 
one’s belief that P constitutes knowledge, then one has a defeater for one’s belief that P’. But Huemer 
offers  no  argument  that  ‘for  each  condition  in  the  analysis  of  knowledge,  any  good  reason  for 
suspecting that a given belief violates that condition would serve as a defeater for that belief’, arguing 
the point only for the uncontroversial case of the truth condition. 
29  Since Williams (1979)  it has been standard  to distinguish omissive  forms of Moore’s paradox (P 
but  I  don’t  believe  P)  from  commissive  forms  (P  but  I  believe  not‐P).  The  reason  I  ignore  the 
commissive  form  here  is  that  my  focus  is  on  epistemic  versions  of  the  paradox,  and  there  is  no 
commissive  form  of  the  epistemic  paradox;  since  knowledge  is  factive,  asserting  or  believing 




section 6  for  the  rejected  claim  that belief  also  aims  at  knowledge—and  that  it  is  self‐defeating  to 
believe something which manifestly cannot meet the aim of belief. I’m also assuming we are dealing 
with  the kinds of beliefs  that  are available on  the basis of  routine  self‐knowledge  rather  than,  say, 
years  of  psychoanalysis,  and  that  it  is  not  too  psychologically  unrealistic  to  suppose  that  ordinary 
subjects are readily capable of the minimal reflection needed to see the self‐defeating nature of such 
beliefs  (on  the  latter assumption see,  for  instance, Green and Williams (2010, pp 10)). Thanks  to a 
referee for suggesting that I clarify the assumptions being made here. This referee also reminded me 
that  quite  a  number  of  epistemologists  think  that,  contrary  to  what  I  have  suggested  here  and 






in  the  following more neutral way; even  if one  is willing  to grant  the assumptions needed  to argue 
that doxastic Moorean beliefs are inherently incongruous, arguing the same point for their epistemic 
counterparts  requires  further,  less  plausible  principles  (of  the  sort  I  argued  against  in  sections  3 
through 6). 
31 Huemer (forthcoming) argues for what he calls the knowledge norm of assertion (see section 4) by 
noting  that  epistemic  Moorean  assertions  ‘sound  akin  to  contradictions’,  and  suggesting  that  the 
simplest explanation of this is that they express inherently incongruous beliefs. He notes that there 
are  a  number  of  competing  accounts  of  the  absurdity  of  epistemic Moorean  assertions,  but  claims 
that any account that relies ‘solely on facts about assertions or utterances’ has the ‘shortcoming’ that 
it won’t be able to explain why it’s irrational to hold the corresponding epistemic Moorean belief. As 
should  be  clear  by  now,  I  don’t  think  we’ve  been  offered  any  good  reason  to  think  that  this  is  a 





say  more  about  what  I  have  in  mind.  I’m  suggesting  that  perhaps  one  common  reason 
epistemologists  tend to overlook the possibility of congruous epistemic Moorean beliefs  is because 
they overlook  the possibility  of  true beliefs  that  are both  justified  and not  true by  luck,  but which 
nonetheless aren’t knowledge. One might suggest that non‐philosophers—at least those (presumably 
the majority) who haven’t been exposed to Gettier’s examples—will even overlook the possibility of 










text  above.  So  I  continue  to  think  there  remains  some  promise  to my  proposed  explanation,  even 
when extended to non‐philosophers. That said, I do acknowledge that it is rather spectulative, and so 
I  welcome  the  referee’s  observation  that  there  may  be  alternative  explanations  available  of  the 
absurdity of epistemic Moorean assertions that would cohere with my other arguments in this paper, 
since  this  suggests  that  those  other  arguments  need  not  stand  or  fall  with  my  speculations 
concerning epistemic Moorean assertions. In particular, the referee notes that Coffman (forthcoming) 






sometimes seems to be suggesting  that sceptical arguments  that start  from the possibility  that one 
could  be  dreaming  are  distinctive  because  the  dreaming  scenario  is  a  close  possibility  (see,  for 
instance, Sosa 2007, lecture 1), and Williamson has suggested that judgment scepticism differs from 
more  familiar  forms of  scepticism  in  invoking close scenarios  (2007, pp 250‐1). But both Sosa and 
Williamson contrast these examples with standard sceptical arguments invoking scenarios involving 
demons, envatted brains and the like. 
35  My  own  position  (following Wright  2004,  who  is  in  turn  inspired  by Wittgenstein)  is  that  the 
scenarios make vivid the fact that our ordinary practice of taking our experiences at more or less face 
value and forming beliefs on that basis rests on a number of presuppositions; one presupposes that 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